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Abstract
Levinas’s work is situated within the context of the recent debate on nature and naturalism in Anglo-American philosophy, this debate is shown to weigh in favour of scientism, and the state of play in Continental philosophy is acknowledged. His conceptions of God, theism, and atheism are examined, and the implications drawn out for an understanding of the distinction between ethics and nature, and, more generally, the limits of nature and naturalism. It is concluded that Levinas’s position is best understood in expansive naturalistic terms, and that he can help us to see what it could mean for such a position to be genuinely theistic. 
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1. Nature and naturalism: some preliminaries
Naturalism has long been the main programmatic orientation of Anglo-American philosophy, and this has been interpreted for the most part as an unambiguously good thing. John Hermann Randall Jr affirms that 'naturalistic method is the starting point of genuine philosophizing'.​[1]​ He claims also that 'naturalism' can be defined negatively 'as the refusal to take "nature" or "the natural" as a term of distinction',​[2]​ and that  'nature' has become the 'the all-inclusive category'.​[3]​ Similar approbatory sentiments occur more recently. So, for example, in a lecture entitled 'Whatever happened to Naturalism?', Richard Bernstein cites a statement prepared for a workshop on naturalism by Joseph Margolis and Mark Gottlieb in which it is claimed that naturalism is a 'relatively explicit philosophical movement featuring what many believe to be the strongest and most promising achievements of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy'.​[4]​ Elsewhere, we are told that naturalism has become 'a slogan in the name of which the vast majority of work in analytic philosophy is pursued'.​[5]​ 
	Randall's negative definition of 'naturalism' as the refusal to take 'nature' or 'the natural' as a term of distinction implies that there is nothing beyond nature - that nature is all that there is - and the position is further corroborated with his claim that naturalism 'finds itself in thoroughgoing opposition to all forms of thought which assert the existence of a supernatural or transcendental Realm of Being and make knowledge of that realm of fundamental importance to human living'. Hence: 'there is no room for any Supernatural in naturalism - no supernatural or transcendental God and no personal survival after death'.​[6]​ A similar antipathy to the supernatural is to be found in the work of more recent naturalists. Thus John Dupré describes his own version of the ontological aspect of naturalism as 'anti-supernaturalism',​[7]​ and Barry Stroud claims in similar vein that:
 
Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism...By 'supernaturalism' I mean the invocation of an agent or force that somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and whose doings cannot be understood as part of it. Most metaphysical systems of the past included some such agent. A naturalistic conception of the world is opposed to all of them...Most philosophers for at least one hundred years have been naturalists in the non-supernaturalist sense.​[8]​ 	  

	So the naturalist brings us down to earth by focusing upon the 'familiar' natural world. The 'supernatural' realm is associated with theism, but demons and ghosts fall into the offending category, and there are conceptions of value which are said to presuppose a  'supernaturalist' framework. James Griffin objects as follows: 

[v]alues do not need any world except the ordinary world around us - mainly the world of humans and animals and happenings in their lives. An other-worldly realm of values just produces unnecessary problems about what it could possibly be and how we could learn about it'.​[9]​ 

	How is this familiar and ordinary natural world to be understood? The predominant naturalist response has been to restrict its contents to what can be comprehended scientifically. Thus Randall tells us that the naturalist's creed involves 'reliance on an unrestricted scientific method': '[t]here is no "realm" to which these methods of dealing with nature cannot be extended'.​[10]​ A similar creed predominates in contemporary naturalism, for it is said to involve a commitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature (the ontological theme), and a reconception of the traditional relation between philosophy and science according to which philosophical inquiry is conceived as continuous with science (the methodological theme).​[11]​ This is scientific naturalism, its ontological dimension is encapsulated in Wilfrid Sellars' claim that 'science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not',​[12]​ although the position varies depending upon how broadly or narrowly we interpret the limits of science, and how weakly or strongly the aforementioned themes are to be understood.​[13]​
	Science is certainly a measure of things, and the achievements of modern science must be acknowledged and respected, not least because it has given us the resources for explaining nature in a systematic way. What does not follow, however, is that science is the only measure of things, and it is difficult to see how one might begin to defend such a stance. Not on scientific grounds, for the idea that science has a monopoly on reality and explanation takes us beyond the limits of science to philosophy, and it is unclear what philosophical justification there could be for imposing such strictures. In voicing such complaints John McDowell exhorts us to 'discourage this dazzlement by science' which leads us to suppose that 'genuine truth is restricted to what can be validated by their methods'.​[14]​ 
	Anti-scientistic sentiments are a staple of continental philosophy, although the term 'naturalism' is not always used,​[15]​ and the target has tended to be those who have responded in the disputed way to the supposed excesses of German Idealism.​[16]​ Such sentiments are expressed most explicitly in the phenomenological movement beginning with Husserl,​[17]​ and they are taken up by Levinas in the course of defending a picture which is anti-naturalistic in this scientistic sense, whilst also being firmly rooted in the ordinary world around us. Such a focus is part and parcel of Griffin's approach, and he describes his position as an expansive form of naturalism - 'expansive' in the sense that it takes us beyond the parameters of scientism, and 'naturalistic' in the sense that there is no reference to any second, supernatural, realm. McDowell seeks likewise to defend a naturalism which gives due weight to the richness of the ordinary world, insisting that we must accommodate the moral dimension at play when values make normative demands upon us and we act accordingly. The picture is not remotely anti-scientific, and was well captured in 1948 by Merleau-Ponty: 

'[t]he question which modern philosophy asks in relation to science is not intended either to contest its right to exist or to close off any particular avenue to its inquiries. Rather, the question is whether science does, or ever could, present us with a picture of the world which is complete, self-sufficient and somehow closed in upon itself, such that there could no longer be any meaningful questions outside this picture. ​[18]​

	What are the implications of this more expansive naturalism for an understanding of human nature? We are natural beings in a natural world, capable of reasoning, of appreciating and promoting value, and of many other things besides. The supernaturalist temptation is to suppose that these capacities are to be grafted onto an autonomously existing animal nature - the nature we have in common with other animals. As McDowell puts it, it is as if we have a 'foothold in the animal kingdom and a mysterious separate involvement in an extra-natural world'.​[19]​ However, this would return us to the offending two-worlds position and there would be no way of acknowledging that we are different from other animals, but animals nonetheless, and part of the ordinary world we all share. The alternative is to locate the relevant capacities in our being human animals, human animals possessing propensities which go beyond the purely biological, the most salient for our purposes being those by virtue of which we can be described as naturally ethical. It is at this level that we can be said to possess a second nature - a nature which sets us apart from other animals, albeit at no cost to our animal being, and at no cost to the idea that there are significant continuities across the boundary.​[20]​ 	
	This schematic survey of the philosophy of nature and naturalism is by no means exhaustive, and many questions and problems have been left aside. However, we have a sense of the current state of play, and of the issues which divide the disputants. Naturalism is either scientific or expansive, this difference is reflected in a correspondingly narrow or broad conception of nature's (including human nature's) limits, but in either guise there is a rejection of a two-world position. Such a rejection constitutes naturalism's anti-supernaturalism, but we can note that supernaturalism admits likewise of two interpretations, and that the expansive naturalist concedes in this direction from the standpoint of the scientific naturalist given that, for the latter, 'supernatural' is the logical complement of 'natural' in the scientific sense. The implication here is that supernaturalism is not invariably opposed to good philosophical practice, assuming, of course, that scientism stands to be criticised on this ground. The expansive naturalist can be described as a supernaturalist in this respect, but he rejects any reference to worlds behind the scenes and is typically dismissive of theism.​[21]​ I have argued elsewhere that supernaturalism (in this dualistic sense) and theism do not stand or fall together, that there is scope for defending a theistic form of naturalism, and that Levinas is a key figure in understanding the possible shape of such a position.​[22]​ It is to Levinas whom I now turn.   

2. Introducing Levinas
Levinas offers an interesting position for the purposes of understanding the limits of nature and naturalism. First, his position involves God, although he has little time for theology and discerns a merit in atheism. His attitude is at one with the typical naturalist in these respects, and we shall see that there is a knife edge between his brand of theism and the (typical) expansive naturalist's atheism. So in Levinas we get an interesting take on the question of what it could mean for nature to be God-involving, although Levinas operates with a conception of nature which makes it difficult for him to defend such a view. Second, he takes issue with scientific naturalism for excluding the ethical, the ethical, for Levinas, being that by virtue of which we escape the limits of 'being' to become receptive to transcendence and infinity. It will be necessary here to negotiate the precise import of his terminology, and to establish in particular what the relation is between 'being' as he understands it and the conceptions of nature we have distinguished. It remains to be seen whether he is in a position to make sense of there being an ethical nature, and what the relation is between nature thus conceived and the value-involving conception of the typical expansive naturalist. Levinas insists on a separation between ourselves and nature, and it maps onto that which he takes to exist between the ethical and the natural. We have seen that an analogous separation is endorsed by the expansive naturalist in the course of distinguishing between ourselves and other animals, that there are good reasons for insisting upon it, and that it need offer no hostage to an invidious supernaturalism. Our examination of Levinas's conception of the relevant difference(s) will begin from this discussion. 

3. Levinas on God, theism, and atheism
The naturalist refuses to take 'nature' as a term of distinction, and objects, in particular, to any position which asserts 'the existence of a supernatural or transcendental Realm of Being and make[s] knowledge of that realm of fundamental importance to human living'. The offending realm of being is associated primarily with theism, and its rejection is said to involve an 'anti-supernaturalism'. Levinas is a theist in one clear sense, for he is concerned above all with the question of what it could mean to relate authentically to God. He insists also that an authentic relation to God is of fundamental importance to human living, and that this expresses a kind of knowledge. This knowledge is practical rather than theoretical. More specifically, it is ethical knowledge. Hence 'there can be no "knowledge" of God separated from the relationship with men',​[23]​ and '[t]he attributes of God are given not in the indicative, but in the imperative...To know God is to know what must be done. ​[24]​ To put it in the clearest terms, Levinas is claiming that knowledge of God is expressed when one acts morally towards another person. 
	The idea that knowledge of God is expressed in our moral interactions with others suggests that it remains firmly rooted in this world.​[25]​ In Griffin's terms, the focus is the world of humans and happenings in their lives.​[26]​ Knowing God is not a matter of knowing some other-worldly realm, and Levinas makes clear that he stands opposed to the postulation of such a realm,​[27]​ referring with relief to 'the death of a certain god inhabiting the world behind the scenes'.​[28]​ He can be described as an 'anti-supernaturalist' in this respect, agreeing with the aforementioned critics that theistic supernaturalism is paradigmatic. 
	The typical naturalist will object that Levinas's dismissal of 'worlds behind the scenes' is insincere and/or misconceived given his interest in the God/man relation. This is to assume, however, that reference to God involves the postulation of a world behind the scenes, that we can relate to Him only by relating to such a world, and that we are clear in any case about what it really means to talk in this way. Levinas is adamant that God can be brought into the equation only with a rejection of a world behind the scenes, and he insists also that there is a sense in which God must be absent from the world which remains - this world, the only world there is. As he puts it, '[s]pirituality is offered up not through a tangible substance, but through absence',​[29]​ and '[e]thics is not the corollary of the vision of God, it is that very vision'.​[30]​ The remarkable and potentially paradoxical thought here is that God can be present in the world only by being absent. Hence: 'The God who hides His face and is recognised as being present and intimate: is this really possible?'​[31]​ It is in the context of trying to make sense of this possibility that we can appreciate Levinas's attitude to atheism. 
	The atheist is applauded for taking us beyond the false and infantile gods of superstition. Such gods are cannon fodder for the naturalist, and Levinas agrees that they are dispensable. He implicates the God of Christianity in this context, objecting to its  'consolation of divine presence', which, he believes, casts humanity in the role of a helpless child who turns to God in the way that one might turn to a parent.​[32]​ The objection then is that we are discouraged from doing the required moral work, ergo we are discouraged from knowing God. In this sense 'the adult's God [God properly so called] is revealed precisely through the void of the child's heaven'.​[33]​ 
	Clearly Levinas is not endorsing atheism if this is taken to mean rejecting God, and he insists that the 'desperate pride of the atheist' is on the same problematic level as the attitude of one for whom God is 'something revealed like an image in a dark room'.​[34]​ Talk of the atheist's pride relates to a further sense in which the term 'atheism' is exploited by Levinas, namely, to capture the natural condition of the self-interested self who 'lives outside of God, at home with [it]self...an I, an egoism...naturally atheist'.​[35]​ This 'natural atheism' is an important and necessary stage of self-development, and 'prior to both the negation and the affirmation of the divine'.​[36]​ So there is no ethics (hence no religion) at this level, and it is a 'great glory for the creator to have set up a being capable of atheism, a being which, without having been causa sui, has an independent view and word and is at home with itself'.​[37]​ Such independency outstrips that of the pre-ethical self, and it is expressed, for example, when God is refused in the more familiar sense of the term 'atheism'. 
	The natural atheist is an egoist, but lacks the 'desperate pride' of this more familiar atheist. Levinas sees in this latter figure a more pernicious kind of egoism - one in which man seeks to become the 'measure of all things'.​[38]​ Philosophy is implicated in this, and is said to be 'fundamentally opposed to a God that reveals...[It is] atheism, or rather, unreligion'.​[39]​ This implies that philosophy can tell us nothing about what really matters, and that any attempt to 'thematize' God (or 'the Metaphysical') will be frustrated. It is in this context that the term 'atheism' reappears - this time to refer to the 'atheism of the metaphysician', which 'means, positively, that our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behaviour and not theology, not a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God'.​[40]​ The 'Metaphysical' in this context refers to the dimension of reality at issue when we relate to God, and the point is that such a relation is secured in praxis rather than theory. Atheism in this sense is to be embraced and applauded: it is the stance required if one is to relate authentically to God. 
	The idea that philosophy is fundamentally opposed to a God that reveals is familiar from the naturalistic sentiments with which we began. The implication there, however, was that God is to be rejected in favour of philosophy, and even philosophy itself to be subsumed by science. Assuming then that philosophy is understood in these naturalistic terms, and that these terms exclude God, Levinas's claim is vindicated. The difference, of course, is that, for Levinas, philosophy itself stands accused on this score, the fundamental charge being that it is a self-serving activity which remains closed to morality and, hence, to God. The complaint has a point as far as scientific naturalism is concerned, for its aim is to provide the measure of all things, and it remains closed to certain dimensions of reality. However, none of this implicates philosophy per se: philosophy clearly has the wherewithal to challenge the offending reductionism, and, with it, the assumption that science provides reality's exclusive measure. 
	Expansive naturalism offers a philosophical approach which is open to morality, and it promises to accommodate the moral responses which, for Levinas, must be operative if we are to relate authentically to God. In its typical guise, however, it stands opposed to God in that the limits of nature - liberal though they are - are not expanded in a theistic direction. Now if we accept with Levinas that being moral is just what it is to relate to God, then the expansive naturalist is already open to God by virtue of operating with a conception of nature which gives due weight to our moral responses, so he can be described as a closet theist. It would be equally plausible, however, to say that Levinas is a closet atheist, and this would no doubt be the response of the typical expansive naturalist given his antipathy to God and given Levinas's own anti-theistic sentiments.
	The issues are too complex to be resolved here,​[41]​ but there are important implications for how we think about the limits of nature and naturalism, and where Levinas fits into the equation. It should be clear from what has been said that although there are conceptions of atheism which are compatible with theism, the question of what it means to be a theist remains obscure. So the question of nature's limits is left unresolved, although we have begun to narrow the gap between Levinas's position and that of the expansive naturalist. I want now to look more closely at this relation. 

4. Levinas on the limits of nature
Levinas shares the expansive naturalist's disdain for any approach that squeezes value out of the picture, and he expresses these anti-reductive sentiments using his own particular terminology. He talks of the tendency to reduce alterity to sameness,​[42]​ to 'totalize',​[43]​ and to fail to acknowledge that which is 'otherwise than being' - all ways of capturing the offending approach and gesturing towards the distinction which is fundamental to his overall philosophy, and variously expressed here as that between totality and infinity, the same and the other, being and otherwise than being, ontology and ethics. The terminology recalls some of the previously discussed theistic themes, but we could talk with equal propriety of the distinction between the non-ethical and the ethical, and it is familiar in any case that the limits of the ethical have yet to be established. 
	Commentators have been quick to recruit Levinas to the anti-scientistic cause, tending for the most part to identify the object of attack as naturalism per se - understandably so, given that more liberal conceptions of naturalism have only recently gained prominence. Thus, Michael L. Morgan talks of Levinas's 'objection to a thoroughgoing naturalism',​[44]​ and Eric Sean Nelson claims that he 'relentlessly criticises discourses of nature, naturalness, and naturalism in the name of the ethical'. Nelson adds that the relevant discourses comprise 'positivistic and reductive naturalism and materialism', and that Levinas takes them to 'undermin[e] the transcendence occurring through the ethical relation to the other'. He concludes that '[e]thics requires the interruptive and reorienting force of transcendence, infinity, and the otherwise than being in relation to being and biology'.​[45]​ 
	The idea that reductive naturalism and materialism undermine the ethical is familiar from what has been said on behalf of the expansive naturalist, the ethical being a placeholder for the dimension of reality in play when morality comes into the picture. So we have a distinction between the ethical and the non-ethical, and Nelson aligns it with that between the ethical and the natural. The ethical in this context is said to involve transcendence, infinity, and the otherwise than being, and the natural is identified with being and biology. The implication is that the terms of the distinction are mutually exclusive, and hence, that there is no room for allowing that nature itself can be value-involving.​[46]​ This much threatens the possibility of describing Levinas as an expansive naturalist, but his terminology is slippery, and we have noted that the terms of the debate have been loaded in favour of a scientific interpretation of 'nature' and 'naturalism'. It remains open then that his objections are more properly directed towards scientism, and that there is a more liberal conception of these notions which grant Levinas the right to allow that nature itself can be value-involving. 
	There is certainly much in Levinas to suggest that nature is to be conceived in non-ethical and pejorative terms, and that it is to be transcended if we are to stand in ethical relations. He refers to a 'pure nature' which is 'indifferent and inhuman', 'does not attest to the glory of God', and is 'situated on the fringes of this human world'.​[47]​ He claims that the name 'matter' - 'which is anonymousness itself' - belongs to this 'non-human order',​[48]​ and that 'the rational animal qua animal is founded in nature'.​[49]​ Elsewhere, nature is described as 'impersonal' and 'faceless',​[50]​ and identified with the struggle for existence. There is said to be a perennial threat of our being engulfed by the relevant natural processes to become merely natural beings,​[51]​ although equal emphasis is placed upon the fundamental separation that exists between ourselves and this impersonal realm. It is at this level that the distinction between animal and human appears,​[52]​ animal life being characterised by the struggle for existence: 'the being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle without ethics. It is a question of might';​[53]​ ethics is 'against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first'.​[54]​ Levinas makes clear that certain steps have to be traversed - '[e]goism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority' - before we ascend to the properly human.​[55]​ The point is familiar from what we have been told about the virtues of natural atheism, but we are encouraged to suppose that 'with the appearance of the human...there is something more important than my life'. 
	It is clear from all of this that the distinction between the natural and the ethical is fundamental to Levinas's position, and that there is an interpretation according to which these terms are to be set in opposition. Thus understood, nature - or 'pure nature' - involves physical events and processes (the name 'matter' belongs to it), and animal life is also part of the picture. Life thus understood is a struggle for existence and 'a question of might', and it stands opposed to ethics, which latter challenges and 'forbids' such egoism. The idea that there is a dimension of nature which is to be comprehended in non-ethical terms is both important and correct, at least if taken to mean that there is more to nature than beings like ourselves who are capable of being moral.​[56]​ It enables us to make sense of the non-human world, and, assuming that there are significant continuities between ourselves and nature thus conceived, suggests a way of making sense of how humanity might have emerged from a level of existence which is found in non-human animals. As McDowell put it, we avoid having to say that we have a 'foothold in the animal kingdom and a mysterious separate involvement in an extra-natural world'. But surely Levinas is committed to the idea of a mysterious involvement along these lines, for he is concerned with our relation to the ethical, and the ethical, as he understands it, involves 'transcendence' and 'infinity', which latter are to be comprehended in theistic terms. It is in this context that he talks of our escaping the limits of being.  
	It should be clear from what has been said that, for Levinas, the limits of being are not to be escaped by ascending to a second, supernatural world. Rather, we are concerned with a dimension of this world, namely, that which is revealed in our moral interactions with others. Nevertheless, it surely makes sense to press the objection that it is manifestly mysterious to introduce God into these interactions, and that a consequence of making such a move is that we precisely do have a separate involvement in an extra-natural world. After all, it is no part of Levinas's position that God is reducible to nature, even on a more liberal construal thereof. 
	We can agree that it is manifestly mysterious to introduce God into our moral interactions, for God Himself is irreducibly mysterious - hence Levinas's objections to the pretensions of theology. However, this is not a sufficient reason for excluding such a move, although the scientific naturalist will try to convince us otherwise given his bias towards 'the unpuzzling'.​[57]​ What of the idea that we are left with a separate involvement in an extra-natural world? Given that God exceeds the limits of nature even as non-scientistically described, then He counts as 'extra-natural' in the strongest sense. As noted, however, Levinas rejects reference to a second, extra-natural, realm, insisting that our relation to God is exhausted in our moral interactions with others.​[58]​ It follows that the putatively extra-natural realm to which we relate in this way is the natural world in which these interactions take place, and given that these interactions reveal the ethical dimension of reality, then we have a clear sense in which nature thus conceived can be described as value-involving.​[59]​ We must presumably add that this value-involving world is perhaps not so familiar as the typical expansive naturalist would have us believe, for, on Levinas's position, these interactions point beyond themselves towards hidden, mysterious depths. The expansive naturalist could rightly question our entitlement to describe these depths in theistic terms, and Levinas would presumably have sympathy for this response given his preference for praxis over theory. We can note, however, that it is compatible with the expansive naturalist's approach that such a position be taken seriously. After all, he seeks to avoid blocking off important avenues of enquiry for the sake of an ideological prejudice,​[60]​ and insists above all else that the question of the limits of nature must be raised anew.   

5. Separation
The ethical dimension of reality may well be mysterious in some sense and perhaps none the worse for that, but what of the idea that it is somehow separate from our foothold in the animal kingdom? When McDowell worries about our having a separate involvement in an extra-natural world, he has in mind a certain way of comprehending the distinction between animal and human. According to the offending approach, animals and humans share a common, animal, nature, the difference being that we also have something non-animal - an immortal soul perhaps - by virtue of which we partake in a world other than the natural world we share with other animals. On such a framework, we are 'peculiarly bifurcated'​[61]​ in the sense that our humanity is utterly divorced from our natural being.​[62]​ So discontinuity is stressed at the expense of continuity, the idea of a distinctively human animal is compromised, and we are left with no way of explaining how our human capacities might have emerged from our animal being in the first place. We are returned also to a position in which our moral responses must surely float free of the natural world. 
	This is the picture to be avoided, and McDowell proposes an alternative which gives due weight to continuity and discontinuity. The relevant discontinuity involves but is not reducible to the boundary between ethical animals and other animals,​[63]​ and our ethical nature is accommodated from within the framework of our natural human being on a suitably expanded conception thereof.​[64]​ This conception is spelled out with reference to the (Aristotelian) idea of second nature, second nature involving those propensities of human beings which cannot be comprehended in purely biological terms and which are imparted by education or upbringing. The general idea then is that it is our second nature which marks us out as distinctively human, and which, amongst other things, equips us to acknowledge the requirements of morality. That is to say, we are ethical by virtue of being human rather than by virtue of possessing a non-natural soul. And, given that we are human animals - 'the idea of the human is the idea of what pertains to a certain species of animals'​[65]​ - it is to be expected that there are continuities across the human/animal spectrum which lend plausibility to the idea that our ethical nature evolved from a purely animal basis.​[66]​ Clearly, it is a condition of making good this genealogy that the relevant similarities are identified and acknowledged .​[67]​
	Levinas is anxious to lend emphasis to the separation between ourselves and other animals, and it is a persistent theme in his work that our humanity sets us apart in the relevant respect, and that it sets us apart more generally from nature itself. The possibility of distinguishing ourselves from nature depends upon how 'nature' is to be interpreted, and we have seen that there are conceptions which legitimate such a distinction. We can agree likewise that we are to be distinguished from other animals,​[68]​ and that we are distinguished by virtue of our ethical nature, although it is contentious to suppose that this is the only way of making the distinction. What is less clear is how Levinas interprets the nature of this distinction, and whether he can avoid having to say that we are 'peculiarly bifurcated'. 
	He grants continuities between ourselves and other animals, for he sees animal egoism as a crucial stage of self-development, and claims that certain steps have to be traversed if we are to reach the ethical/human level in which 'there is something more important than my life'. It is made clear also that there remains a perennial tendency 'to put my own existence first', and that the 'atheist separation' this involves is crucial to the possibility of being able to open up in the required way.​[69]​ So no reason yet for thinking that human being stands entirely apart from animal being, although Levinas makes clear that the transition at issue is cataclysmic. After all, it is a matter of 'break[ing] that most radical and unalterably binding of chains...the chains of the I to the self'.​[70]​ This might be thought to compromise the possibility of there being a relation between the two modes of being, but it is no part of the picture that everything changes, although there is presumably a qualitative change whose transformative effects go all the way down.​[71]​ We can note also that the 'new dimension' which comes into being when the relevant chains are broken opens in the face-to-face encounter, and in particular, 'in the sensible appearance of the [other's] face'. The implication again is that it is our embodied humanity which is at stake,​[72]​ and this world which undergoes a transformation: 'The relationship with the Other is not produced outside of the world, but puts in question the world possessed'.​[73]​

6. Ethics versus nature, again
Levinas can escape the charge that we are 'peculiarly bifurcated', and he offers an account of our humanity which grants a distinction between ourselves and other animals whilst conceding nothing to suspect supernaturalism. As such, the general structure of the position can be upheld, and I have argued that it conforms to a (liberal) naturalistic paradigm. This is not to deny that questions can be raised about the precise details of the account, and that there are elements to be amended or dismissed. The point is simply that it offers the prospects for defending a conception of our separation from the rest of nature which is compatible with our sharing a common world. This is surely to be applauded. 
	It is one thing to say that we are to be distinguished from the rest of nature by virtue of being ethical, and quite another to say that the rest of nature lacks any moral standing. However, this is precisely the implication that some commentators have found in Levinas. Thus Derrida, having granted a distinction between human and animal, objects that Levinas's framework reduces the second term of this distinction to 'the set of the Animal in general', and that:

'[t]he confusion of all nonhuman living creatures to within the general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking...it is also a crime. Not a crime against animality precisely, but a crime of the first order against animals. Do we agree to presume that every murder, every transgression of the commandment "Thou shalt not Kill" concerns only man...and that in sum there are only crimes "against humanity"?'​[74]​

	It is true that Levinas shows little interest in the different kinds of animal, and this is one area where his position would benefit from further detail, particularly given the contentious issues surrounding continuity and discontinuity across the human/animal divide.​[75]​ It is true also that his focus is upon the ethical relation between human beings, and that little is said about the moral status of animals, or of the natural world per se for that matter. The first deficiency has no immediate moral implications, for it is not ruled out that there are reasons for according a moral status to the general category of animal. We are to suppose, however, that such reasons do not appeal to Levinas, and that it is an implication of his position that we are permitted to treat other animals - and nature itself - as we like.  
	Levinas's conception of the ethical relation is spelled out with reference to the face-to-face encounter, and his focus is the face of the human. However, he allows that we can talk of a dog's face in a limited sense,​[76]​ and is rightly reticent over the question of a snake. (The question of continuity and discontinuity again.) He is asked in interview whether we have obligations towards animals if they do not have a face, and responds that 'it is clear that, without considering animals as human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings'. He adds that '[t]he animal suffers. It is because we, as human, know what suffering is that we can have this obligation'.​[77]​ 
	Animal ethics is one thing, but what of nature per se. The concept of nature per se is ill-defined, and there are conceptions thereof for which Levinas is perfectly happy to grant an ethics, for example, nature as involving human beings and dogs. What of an ethics of the environment? Nelson argues that there are obstacles in the way of defending such a stance on Levinas's behalf. First, Levinas tends to treat the environment as a place of exile over which we have unconditional priority; and second, there is no reference to its domination and exploitation, the focus being exclusively upon human and animal life.​[78]​ Add to that that Levinas treats it as a place of egoistic struggle and strife, and the prospects for developing an environmental ethics look dim.​[79]​ The question of continuity and discontinuity is relevant, and Nelson suggests that a focus upon Levinas's commitment to our materiality offers a possible way ahead. To put it in my preferred terms, progress is to be made by looking more closely at the implications of Levinas's naturalism. Nelson also refers to a passage from 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity' concerning a second-century exegete who 'did not understand why the Bible begins with the account of creation instead of putting us from the first before the first commandments of Exodus'. Levinas responds as follows: 

Only with great difficulty did he come to concede that the account of creation was all the same necessary for the life of the just man: for if the earth had not been given to man but simply taken by him, he would have possessed it only as an outlaw.​[80]​
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